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A Debtor's Right to Avoid Liens Against
Exempt Property Under Section 522
of the Bankruptcy Code:
Meaningless or Meaningful?
by
Veryl Victoria Miles*
As a law founded in equity, bankruptcy law serves a twofold purpose. It
provides the debtor with a fresh start and the creditors with the right to share
equitably in the assets of the estate. However, before the creditors are allowed
to participate in the distribution of the estate assets, certain properties of the
estate are identified as necessary for the debtor's fresh start and classified as
exempt property.2 Because exempt property is essential to the lifeblood of
bankruptcy's fresh start policy, it is not available to settle the claims of general
unsecured creditors and will be relinquished to the debtor.3 Exempt property
typically includes properties of necessity such as homesteads, household goods,
clothing, wage earnings and a debtor's tools of trade.4 The exemptions may
*Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1The equitable nature of bankruptcy law has been consistent throughout the evolution of bankruptcy
law. In Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (1913), the United States Supreme Court described the pur,
pose of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as follows: "It is the twofold purpose of the bankruptcy act to convert
the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors, and then to give the bankrupt a fresh
start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched' Id. at 473. This twofold purpose was
brought forward in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter
referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code"]. In its statement of purpose accompanying the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress stated that "Itlhe major purpose of the [Reform Act) is the modernization of the bankruptcy
laws.... the substantive law of bankruptcy and current bankruptcy system were designed in [the Bankruptcy
Act of] 1898. S. RaP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinred in, 1978 US.. CoD CONG. & ArDm.
Naws 5787, 5788.
2The "fresh start" policy embodied in our bankruptcy laws, and the significance of exempt property in
its implementation, were described by the Supreme Court in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Hall, 229 U.S.
511 (1913): "[T]he general policy of the [Bankruptcy] act... was intended not only to secure equity among
creditors, but for the benefit of the debtor in discharging him from his liabilities and enabling him to start
afresh with the property set apart to him as exempt' Id. at 515.
3Id.
4
or a description of exempt property under the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West
1979 & Supp. 1990). See also 7 W. CoLta.R, CoTiTsRF ON BAKRutu cy (15th ed. 1979) (a complete statutory
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be limited to dollar value amounts that are presumed to be sufficient to help
facilitate the debtor's fresh start.5
Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 6 provides these rules governing ex-
empt property under current bankruptcy law:
Such property is-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this
section unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor
under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not
so authorize; or in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other
than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that
is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place
in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180
days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, or for a longer portion of such 180 day period than in any
other place. .... 7
Under this provision, the debtor may choose either to exempt from the bank-
ruptcy estate properties which are defined as exempt in section 522(d) of the
Code8 or to exempt properties defined as exempt by his or her state exemp-
tion law, whichever is more beneficial. 9 In some cases, however, the debtor may
be denied the right to choose between federal and state exemptions if the debtor
resides in a state which has elected to exercise its right under the section to
"opt out" of the federal exemptions by limiting its residents who file for bankrupt-
cy to the state exemptions only. 0
To ensure the debtor's enjoyment of exempt property, the Code also au-
thorizes the debtor to avoid certain liens that secured creditors may have against
exempt property, pursuant to section 522(f)." The liens that are avoidable under
compilation of state exemption laws in the United States). For a description of the historical evolution of
exemption laws throughout the United States, their purpose and the types of properties generally provid-
ed to debtors as exempt under state exemption laws, see Resnick, Planning or Fraudulent Transfer?: cThe Use
of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUtrER L. Rv.
615, 620-27 (1978); and Vukowich, Purposes and Effects of the Exemption Laws, 62 GEo. LJ. 779, 797-832
(1974).
5See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West 1979); 7 W. Coini, supra note 4; Resnick, supra note 4, at 627-29;
and Vukowich, supra note 4, at 829-32.
611 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West 1979).
7Id.
811 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West 1979).
9See D. CowANs, BA.NpTrcy LAw AND PRACTCB § 8.3, at 22 (1989); and B. WEIn-RAu & A. Ras-
NIcK, BANKRitucY LAW MAuAL 4.07, at 4-32 (1986).
'
5See sources cited supra note 9.
"Section 522(f) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an ex-
emption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
(Vol. 65
1991) A DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO AVOID LIENS
section 522(f) are limited to "judicial liens" against any exempt personal or real
property, and "nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests" in cer-
tain personal property of the debtor, including the debtor's household goods,
tools of trade and professionally prescribed health aid products.2 This lien avoid-
ance power enhances bankruptcy's fresh start policy by preventing a creditor's
lien against exempt property from impairing the debtor's right to retain that
property as exempt property.
An interpretive question has surfaced concerning whether section 522(b)
permits states that have elected to opt out of the federal exemptions under sec-
tion 522(d) also to opt out of the lien avoidance powers granted to the debtor
under section 522(f). The answer to this question is extremely important be-
cause it determines how meaningful the debtor's right to exempt property will
be in bankruptcy. If a state is permitted to opt out of the lien avoidance provi-
sion as well as the federal exemptions, the debtor's enjoyment of exempt prop-
erty may be significantly diminished where the qualifying exempt property is
heavily encumbered. The courts are divided on whether the states' right to
opt out under section 522(b) is limited to the federal exemptions, or whether
it extends to the lien avoidance provision. 3 This division has found its way
section if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli-
ances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that
are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, ofthe trade ofthe debt-
or or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a depend-
ent of the debtor.
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1979).
121d.
13Cases that interpret section 522(b) to permit states to opt out of the lien avoidance provision under
section 522(f) include: Owen v. Owen, 877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2166 (1990);
Allen v. Hale County State Bank (In re Allen), 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984); Spears v. Thorp Credit, Inc.
(In re Spears), 744 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1984); Giles v. Credithrift of America, Inc. (In re Pine), 717 F.2d
281 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.. 928 (1984); McManus v. Avco Fin. Serv. (In re McManus), 681
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Estep, 96 B.R. 87 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1988); Bessent v. United States (In re
Bessent), 74 B.R. 436 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 817 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1987); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Brooks
(In re Brooks), 71 B.IL 6 (W.D. Ky. 1986), aff'd, 817 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Ellingson, 82 B.R. 88
(N.D. Iowa 1986); and In re Panesky, 5 B.R. 201 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). Cases interpreting section 522(b)
as limiting the states' opt-out rights to the federal exemptions include: Aetna Fin. Co. v. Leonard (In re
Leonard), 866 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1989); Dominion Bank of Cumberlands, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408
(4th Cir. 1985); Hall v. Finance One (In re Hall), 752 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Thompson, 750 F.2d
628 (8th Cir. 1984); Maddox v. Southern Discount Co. (In re Maddox), 713 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983);
In re Cooley, 72 B.R. 54 (N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Pelter, 64 B.R. 492 (Bankr. WD. Okla. 1986); In re Thomp-
son, 59 B.R. 690 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986); In re Jackson, 55 B.R. 343 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1985); and In re
Lawson, 42 B.R. 206 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1984).
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into the decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals, and the question is
pending before the Supreme Court in the case of Owen v. Owen' 4
This article reviews the conflict as it has taken form in the courts of ap-
peal of several circuits. The first section of the article briefly discusses the legis-
lative history of section 522, and the purpose of Congress in providing the debtor
with both exemptions and lien avoidance powers under the Code. It next re-
views the decisions of courts of appeal that have interpreted the extent of the
"opt~out" powers granted to the states under section 522(b). The third and
final section analyzes the two views on the question, and concludes that the
better interpretation is that the states are not permitted to opt out of the lien
avoidance provision of section 522(0 and are only permitted to opt out of the
federal exemptions under section 522(d).
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 522
Allowance for the exemption of property has always been present in our
federal bankruptcy laws.'5 Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the
determination of what property was exempt in bankruptcy was reserved for
the several states. 6 Accordingly, there was no uniformity in determining what
properties would be exempt. It has been suggested that the primary reason for
Congress' failure to provide for federal exemptions under the former Bankruptcy
Act was a sensitivity to states' rights. 7
14877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2166 (1990).
5See Resnick, supra note 4, at 620-22; Vukowich, supra note 4, at 782-83; and Note, Bankruptcy Ex
emptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE LJ. 1459, 1459-63 (1959).
16The exemptions provided under section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 were defined by state ex-
emption laws and federal nonbankruptcy exemption law:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are
prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws in force at the time
of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such
six months than in any other State: Provided, however, that no such allowance shall
be made out of the property which a bankrupt transferred or concealed and which
is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this title for the benefit of the
estate, except that, where the voided transfer was made by way of security only and
the property recovered is in excess of the amount secured thereby, such allowance
may be made out of such excess.
11 U.S.C.A. § 24 (West 1970).
'7Cowans states:
It was within the province of Congress to enact a federal law of exemptions but in
the past the failure to do so seems to have been a matter of policy. Quite possibly
states' rights provided the basis for lack of federal legislation. It is believed that Con-
gressional leaders drafting an updated bankruptcy law wanted a uniform national
exemption law. They took a considerable step in that direction in the new law but
were sufficiently sensitive to the predicted opposition to have offered some outs.
D. CowA ~s, supra note 9, at § 8.2, at 18.
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With the comprehensive revision of federal bankruptcy law under the
Bankruptcy Code,x8 and its inclusion of federal exemptions under section 522(d),
there was some movement toward uniformity. However, the extent of this move-
ment was tenuous, because Congress continued to defer to the states by al-
lowing them to opt out of the federal exemptions and to restrict their residents
to the exemptions prescribed under their own exemption laws.'9
The granting of federal exemptions and permission to the states to opt out
of them is the result of a compromise between the House and Senate. The House
version of the bill provided the debtor with a choice between the federal ex-
emptions that were "specified" in the bill or state defined exemptions. 20 This
addition of federally defined exemptions was designed to bring some sense of
uniformity under the revised bankruptcy exemption law. The Senate version
of the bill, however, tracked the pre-Code practice of leaving the sole determi
nation of exempt property to the states. 21
Unfortunately, section 522, as it was compromised and enacted, has per-
petuated disparity among the states concerning what properties will be ex
empt.22 A large number of states have elected to opt out of the federal exemp-
tions.23 The reasons given for this popular election include "a belief that a federal
law would give the debtors too much" and that "there should be as little fed-
eral law as possible" in such matters.24
There have been numerous legal challenges to the state statutes enacted
'
t The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 3549.
19See supra note 17.
20Section 522(b) of the House Bill provided that:
lA]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) [federal exemptions]
of this section; or in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal [non-bankruptcy
law exemptions], State, or local law, other than subsection (d) of this
section [federal exemptions], that is applicable on the date of the fil-
ing of the petition in which the debtor's domicile has been located. ...
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in APP. 3, W. COrIER, COMR ON BASKRuPTcY 394-95
(15th ed. 1983) (emphasis added).
21Section 522 of the Senate Bill provided that: "[Ain individual debtor may exempt from property of
the estate: (1) any property that is exempt under Federal [non-bankruptcy law exemptions], State, or local
law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile
has been located... ' S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in APP. 3, W. Cot.LmR, Cou.urn ON
BANuwP'rcY 409 (15th ed. 1983).
2
'For a detailed and critical analysis of the effects of the compromise legislation in granting the states
the right to opt out of the federal exemptions, see Haines, Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtors Bankruptcy
Exemption in a Sorry State, 1983 Aiuz. ST. Lj. 1. See also Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy Under the
1978 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 575 (1980); and Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bank
ruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REv. 771 (1980).
23See 7 W. CoLrMR, supra note 4, at 1 n.6; D. Cow:A s, supra note 9, at § 8.2, at 19; B. WtNerTamu
& A. RasNicK, supra note 9, at 4.07, at 4-32.
24See D. CowN-s, supra note 9, at § 8.2, at 18-19.
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to opt out of the federal exemptions. The challenges include the assertion that
these statutes are unconstitutional because Congress was required to provide
uniform bankruptcy laws pursuant Article I, section 8, of the United States
Constitution.2 Another argument against the constitutionality of such sta-
tutes was that Congress cannot delegate its power to provide for uniform laws
by permitting states to opt out of the federal exemptions. 26 These challenges
have failed on the grounds that the Constitution only requires "geographical
uniformity" versus "true uniformity" on the subject of bankruptcy, which is
found in the uniform allowance of exemptions to debtors, and that the "states
retain power to enact bankruptcy laws so long as they do not conflict with
federal bankruptcy legislation. 27 Accordingly, the law is quite settled that sec-
tion 522(b) permits the individual states to opt out of the federal exemptions
and to restrict their residents at bankruptcy to the state-defined exemptions. 28
Congress also empowered the debtor to avoid certain liens against exempt
property that would "impair" his or her right to enjoy the exemption if they
were not avoided. This power of avoidance is provided for under subsection (f)
of section 522 of the Code. Section 522(0 provides that:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may
avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which
the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of
this section if such lien is -
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household
goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books,
animals, crops, musical instruments, or jew-
elry that are held primarily for the personal,
family, or household use of the debtor or a de-
pendent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or
tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade
of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids
for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.29
25See Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 11331 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 992 (1982); In re Lausch, 16 B.R. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981); and In re Vasko, 6 B.R. 317
(Bankr. ND. Ohio 1980).
26SCe cases cited supra note 25.
27In re SuUivan, 680 F.2d at 1134-35, 1137.
21ll U.S.C. § 522(b) (West 1979).
2911 U.S.C. § 522(f). (West 1979).
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The House and Senate were in agreement in providing the debtor with
the lien avoidance power under subsection (f).30 The House and Senate ver
sions of the lien avoidance provision were virtually identical. 31 It is the debt-
or's ability to avoid such liens in bankruptcy that makes exemptions meaning-
ful. If the avoidance of liens on exempt property were not available, the property
would be subject to the claims of the lienholders and secured creditors. Ulti-
mately, the lienholders and secured creditors would be able either (1) to exer-
cise their right to foreclose against such property, and thus deprive the debtor
of his or her right to enjoy the property as exempt property; or (2) to place
the debtor in the unfortunate position of having to reaffirm the debt with the
creditor to prevent the foreclosure, and thus force the debtor to forfeit the ben
3°SeeH.R1 REP. No. 595,95thCong., 1st Sess. 362, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADM N. News
5963, 6318; and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Arnmt.
NEws 5787, 5862.
3'The House Bill version of the lien avoidance provision was as follows:
The debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property
to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor, notwithstanding
any waiver of exemptions, would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, if such lien is-
(1). a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpurchase-money security interest in any
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, orjew-
elry that are held primarily for the personal, family or house-
hold use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the
debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor.
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in APP. 3, W. COLmps, CoLmR ON BAN-uupTcY 400
(15th ed. 1983).
The Senate Bill version of the lien avoidance provision similarly provided:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an ex
emption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jew-
ery that are held primarily for the personal family, or house-
hold use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of
the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor.
S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in APP. 3, W. Couaes., CoLmn. oN BAmtuncy 410 (15th
ed. 1983).
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efits of a bankruptcy discharge for the debt in question. 32
The interpretive question that remains unsettled concerning section 522(b)
is whether it authorizes the states to opt out of the debtor's right to avoid liens
against exempt property in addition to opting out of the federal exemptions.
States that have attempted to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of sec-
tion 522(f) typically have done so by defining "exempt property" as only in-
cluding property owned by the debtor that is unencumbered. 33 Creditors con-
sequently argue that encumbered property cannot be subject to the lien
avoidance provision of section 522(f) because section 522(f) only applies to
property that is defined as exempt. 34 The effect of this line of reasoning is to
make section 522(f) meaningless, since its sole purpose is to allow the debtor
to retain certain properties that are essential to the fresh start, regardless of
the judgment liens or the non-purchase money security interests that may be
held against such property by creditors.
I. OPTING OUT UNDER SECTION 522(b): AS INTERPRETED BY
THE COURTS OF APPEAL
As noted above, the courts, including federal courts of appeal, are divided
on whether the individual states that elect to opt out of the federal exemp-
tions under section 522(b) may also opt out of the lien avoidance powers granted
to debtors under section 522(f). 35 Some courts have held that the states may
not only opt out of the federal exemptions provided under section 522(d), but
that they may also opt out of the debtor's right to avoid liens against exempt
property under section 522(f). 36 Other courts have said that the states are not
permitted to opt out of the lien avoidance powers provided under section 522(f),
based on the plain language of section 522(b) and the congressional intent be-
hind section 522(f). 37
One of the most recent courts of appeal to address this issue is the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In Owen v. Owen,38 the court was asked
to determine whether section 522(f) of the Code permitted the debtor to avoid
a judicial lien against homestead property, where the Florida law creating an
32Congress was well aware of the debtor's plight. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. Naws 5787, 6087-88.
33For examples of such statutes that allow states to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of section
(f), see the state statutes considered in the relevant cases cited supra note 13. In Owen v. Owen, 877 F.2d
44 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2166 (1990), state exemption law excluded encumbered home-
stead property from its homestead exemption if the property had not qualified as homestead property at
the time the judicial lien attached to the property.
34See relevant cases cited supra note 13.
35See cases cited supra note 13.
36See relevant cases cited supra note 13.
37Id.
38877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 2166 (1990).
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exemption in homestead property also permitted the enforcement of a judicial
lien against the homestead property in question. Florida is a state that has elect-
ed to opt out of the federal exemptions and requires that its residents in
bankruptcy use the state defined exemptions only.
The debtor argued that under section 522(f) he was authorized to avoid
a judgment lien against exempt property, so that he should be able to claim
his homestead property free of the outstanding judgment lien. At the time the
judgment lien attached to the property, however, it did not qualify as exempt
property under Florida law, and thus, the lien against the property was en-
forceable at that time.39 Even though state law was amended subsequently,
bringing the property into exempt status at the time the debtor's bankruptcy
petition was filed, the court ruled that the lien could not be avoided under sec-
tion 522(f), because the property did not qualify as exempt property under
Florida state law at the time of the attachment of the judgment lien.40
The court construed section 522(f) to permit only the avoidance of liens
against exempt property and not expand the power of avoidance to properties
that were not exempt under state law.41 It concluded that, "fuInder [Florida]
state law, the homestead exemption precludes attachment of a judgment lien
except where the lien came into existence prior to the property attaining home-
stead status"42 Because the lien in question had attached to the homestead
property before it acquired exempt status under state law, the court ruled that
it was not the type ofjudicial lien intended for avoidance under section 522(f). 43
The court referred to the legislative history of section 522 to support this ar-
gument, stating:
The legislative history of section 522(f) indicates that Con-
gress sought to protect debtors from the race to judgment of-
ten occurring just prior to a debtor filing bankruptcy. That is,
when it appears that a debtor is having trouble meeting his
obligations, creditors rush to reduce their interests to judg-
ment, attaching all of the debtor's property, including that
which would otherwise be exempt .... This is not the case
here. The debtor never held this property exempt from this
judgment lien. 44
As a result of the court's decision, the debtor was denied the right to avoid
the judgment lien against the exempt homestead property, as it existed at the
39Id. at 45.
401d. at 46-47
411d.
411d. at 46.
43Id. at 47.
441d.
1991)
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time that the debtor filed his petition in bankruptcy. By failing to recognize
the status of the property as exempt at the time of the bankruptcy, the state
exemption law had effectively opted out of the debtor's lien avoidance power
under section 522(f) through its enforcement of the judgment lien based on
the status of the property as nonexempt at the time that the lien attached
to it.
The critical question in this case and cases of similar import is whether
section 522(b) authorizes the states electing to opt out of the federal exemp-
tions also to opt out of the bankrupt debtor's right to avoid liens against ex-
empt property under section 522(f). Contrary to the position taken by the court
in Owen v. Owen and the other courts that uphold state exemption laws that
deny the debtor the lien avoidance power granted under section 522(f), there
is no statutory or legislative support for this overly expansive interpretation
of the "opt-out" rights granted to the states under section 522(b).
The Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals are the other courts in ac-
cord with Owen v. Owen, and uphold state statutes that effectively deny the
debtor a right to exercise the lien avoidance powers granted under section 522(f).
In In re McManus, 45 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, be-
cause Louisiana's exemption statute excluded "household goods and furnish
ings subject to a chattle mortgage" from exempt status, such property was not
subject to the lien avoidance provision of section 522(f).46 The court stated
that section 522(f) "provides only a limited mechanism for avoiding liens, since
the only liens that may be avoided are those impairing an exemption the debtor
would have been entitled to under section 522(b)."47 Thus, the court inter-
preted section 522(f) as dependent upon whether the debtor is entitled to ex-
empt the property under section 522(b).48 The court further held that, because
section 522(b) permits the states exclusively to define what property may be
exempt in bankruptcy, and that the encumbered household goods and furnish-
ings held by the debtors were not exempt under the Louisiana statute, the secu-
rity interest against the property was not avoidable under section 522(f). 49
The debtors in this case argued that the rehabilitative policy of section
522(f), which allows a debtor to avoid liens against exempt properties, should
override any individual state policy to preserve liens against such property,
and that "a state cannot control, either directly or indirectly, the content of
the policy of section 522(f)."'5 The court rejected this distinction between sec-
tion 522(b) and 522(f), stating that:
45681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).
461d. at 357.
471d. at 355.
4Sld.
49Id. at 357.
Sld. at 357 n.7.
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Section 522(f) is not a seperate exemption statute.... Sec-
tion 522(f) is not available if an individual state says a debtor
is not entitled to a particular exemption .... If Congress had
intended subsection (f) to be an overriding policy decision, it
would not have made subsection (f) clearly dependent on the
policy determinations by states under section 522(b). 5'
Judge Dyer in his dissent 52 believed that section 522(f)'s avoidance power
was available to the debtor in spite of the Louisiana statute excluding the en-
cumbered household goods and furnishings from its definition of exempt prop-
erty. He based this view on the language of section 522(0, which specifically
provides that the lien avoidance powers are available to a debtor "notwithstand-
ing any waiver of exemptions" by the debtor.53 Judge Dyer concluded that the
creation of a security interest against the encumbered property by the debtor
for the benefit of the creditor was nothing less than a waiver of the exemption
by the debtor, and thus, subject to avoidance under section 522(f).-4 Contrary
to the majority opinion, he also concluded that the Code does not grant states
the right to preempt section 522(0, saying:
Congress intended that even ifa state opts out of the federal
exemptions, the debtor's lien avoidance power under subsec-
tion 522(f) is not thereby affected. And under the supremacy
clause, United States Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, any conflict
between the state lien conservation provision and the feder-
al lien avoidance provision must be constitutionally resolved
in favor of federal law. A state's policy determinations respect-
ing the manner in which its exemptions may be waived should
be given application in its own courts but when the forum is
a federal bankruptcy court such state policy determinations
are subject to congressional override-5
In further support of his position, Judge Dyer cited the legislative history of
section 522(f), which reflects Congressional opinion that because exemptions
are essential to the debtor's rehabilitation the ability to avoid liens against such
property is also essential "regardless of whether or not state law would per-
mit their waiver or surrender.'' 6
slid.
2Id. at 357-59 (Dyer, J., dissenting).
53id. at 358 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(0).
54Id.
55Id. (citations omitted).
'6Id. The Fifth Circuit has been consistent in its interpretation of the relationship between subsections
522(b) and (f). In Allen v. Hale County State Bank (In re Allen), 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984), the court
held that Texas exemption law, which excluded all personal property subject to liens, was not preempted
by the lien avoidance provision under section (f). See also Bessent v. United States (In re Bessent), 831 F.2d
82 (5th Cir. 1987).
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The Sixth Circuit is the only other circuit to take the position that sec-
tion 522(b) permits a state to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of sec-
tion 522(f) as well as the federal exemptions under section 522(d). In consoli-
dated appeals in In re Pine,57 the court held that the federal lien avoidance rule
under section 522(f) was not operative to avoid hens against the debtors' house-
hold goods under Georgia and Tennessee exemption laws, because encumbered
property was specifically excluded from the exemption statutes. Tennessee law
specifically limited exempt property to the debtor's "equity interest" in house-
hold goods.58 Georgia law provided that only the "debtor's interest" in house-
hold goods was exempt property.5 9 The court interpreted the term "debtor's
interest" to include the debtor's equity in property only.60 The court rejected
the debtors' arguments that a state was limited to defining exempt property
under section 522(b) and was not empowered to determine what types of prop-
erty interests were exempt.
In its analysis of the states' power to opt out of the federal exemptions
under section 522(b), the court noted that section 522(b) authorizes the
states to determine what property would be exempt in bankruptcy.61 It stated
that the term property as defined under the Code "is used to denote legal
interests since the Act throughout characterizes property in terms of vari-
ous security and other interests"; thus, it permits states to include only unen-
cumbered property in the definition of exempt property.62 The court refused
to read section 522(f) independently of section 522(b). It therefore concluded
that if encumbered property is not included in the definition of exempt prop-
erty under state law, the liens against such property cannot be avoided under
section 522(f).63
Although the court admitted that bankruptcy law's fresh start policy ar-
guments regarding exempt property did not support this view, it relied upon
what it regarded as the clear language of section 522(b), stating that "the clear
language of the statute takes precedence over the more rehabilitative policies
underlying the Act' 64 The court concluded that the states' authority to en-
act exclusive exemption plans included the option to exclude encumbered prop-
erty under section 522(b).65 Thus, it could not see how Congress could have
intended section 522(f) to "limit the states in their choice of the types of property
57717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.s. 928 (1984).
5Sd. at 283.
601d.
611d. at 282.
62Id. at 283.
63Id. at 284.
64Id.
631d.
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interests debtors could exempt" in bankruptcy.66
In support of their expansive reading of section 522(b), the courts in both
In re Pine and In re McManus therefore embraced the proposition that the lien
avoidance power granted under subsection (f) is dependent upon whether the
property on which the lien is to be avoided is exempt under subsection (b).67
They believed that the "clear" language of subsection (b) permits a state which
has opted out of the federal exemptions to exclude all of a debtor's encumbered
property from its definition of exempt property, thus precluding avoidance of
any liens under section 522(f).68
Contrary to the position of these courts, the opt-out language of section
522(b) is more clearly limited to the states' rights to opt out of the federal ex
emptions provided under subsection (d); it does not include the lien avoidance
powers under subsection (f) due to the lack of any reference to subsection (f)
in section 522(b). This consideration and the rehabilitative policy behind sec-
tion 522 support the opinions rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth,
Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits discussed below, which hold that section
522(b) does not permit states to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of sec-
tion 522(0.
In Dominion Bank v. Nuckolls, 69 a case decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, the debtor sought to exempt restaurant equipment un-
der Virginia homestead exemption law and to avoid a lien against the property.
One of the issues addressed by the court was whether the lien avoidance pro-
vision of section 522(0 applied in a case where the debtor had waived his right
to the exemption prior to bankruptcy and the state exemption law provided
for the enforcement of such waivers against debtors.
The court held that the waiver of the exemption was avoidable under sec-
tion 522(0 of the Code regardless of the state exemption provision to enforce
the waiver against the debtor.70 It described the language of section 522(f) as
"straight forward" in providing for the avoidance of liens notwithstanding any
waiver.7 ' The court cited the legislative history of the provision to support this
conclusion, saying:
The Senate Report, in describing the provision which became
subsection (f), noted that it[:]
6Id. The Sixth Circuit has followed its position on the states' right to opt out of the lien avoidance
provision of section (f) in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 71 B.R. 6 (W.D. Ky. 1986),
affid, 817 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987); and Spears v. Thorp. Credit, Inc. (In re Spears), 744 F.2d 1225 (6th
Cir. 1984).
67See Giles v. Credithrift of America, Inc. (In re Pine), 717 E2d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 1983); and McMa-
nus v. Avco Fin. Sere. (In re McManus), 681 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1982).
681d.
69780 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1985).
70Od. at 412.
7,Id.
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protects the debtor's exemption, his discharge, and
thus his fresh start by permitting him to avoid cer-
tain liens on exempt property. The debtor may
avoid a judicial lien on any property to the extent
that the property could have been exempted in the
absence of the lien, and may similarly avoid a
nonpurchasemoney security interest in certain
household and personal goods. The avoiding power
is independent of any waiver of exemptions. 72
The concurring opinion of Judge Hoffman provides a focused commentary
on the law of exemptions under bankruptcy law, describing it as "imperfect:"73
He discussed the impact that section 522, as compromise legislation,74 has had
on the law of exemptions. Judge Hoffman pointed out that it is the compromise
which creates the conflict, that while the right to opt out under section 522(b)
reflects a Congressional desire to defer to the state exemption laws, the avoidance
powers under 522(f) interfere with state exemption laws that enforce exemp-
tion waivers and exclude encumbered properties from the exemption.75 Although
Judge Hoffman did not disagree with Congressional power to override waiv-
ers and liens under the bankruptcy law, he noted that the authorization given
to the states to opt out of the federal exemptions and to define exemptions them-
selves, coupled with the ability given to bankruptcy debtors to avoid exemp-
tion waivers and liens that may be enforceable under the state law, is "self-
contradictory."76
While the Eighth Circuit in In re Thompson 77 did not consider a state ex-
emption law that was designed to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of
section 522(f), the opinion does provide a view of the opt-out-rights of states
under section 522(b). Presented was the question of whether a debtor could
avoid liens against property claimed as exempt under Iowa law. Conceding that
when the debtor makes this election state law controls what properties would
be exempt in bankruptcy, the court held that "federal law determines the avail-
ability of lien avoidance:' 78 It pointed out that Congress granted debtors lien
avoidance powers to provide debtors with a way to "extricate themselves from
'adhesion contracts' impairing a 'fresh start'" of the debtor79; and that the enact-
72Id. at 413 (quoting S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoD CONG. &
ADNuN. NEws 5787, 5862).
731d. at 414-18 (Hoffman, J., concurring).
74See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
7"780 F 2d at 418 (citing Haines, Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtors'Bankruptcy Exemption in a Sor
ry State, 1983 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 1, 30.)
761d.
77750 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1984).
78Id. at 630.
79Id.
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ment of this provision reflected Congress' concern "with creditors who, in loan-
ing money, took security interests in all of a debtor's personal belongings, and
then threatened repossession as a means of coercing repayment from fright-
ened debtors "80 Noting that the lien avoidance powers under the provision were
limited, the court quoted these statements of Justice Blackmun in United States
v. Security Industrial Park:s8
Section 522(0(2) permits the debtor to "avoid the fixing" of
a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in cer-
tain property, but the subsection does not extend to all prop-
erty otherwise exempt.... It is limited to certain personal
items, such as household firnishings, wearing apparel, jewelry,
tools of the debtor's trade, and professionally prescribed health
aids.82
Although the property that the debtor sought to exempt in this case was ex-
empt under Iowa law, the liens were not in "the sort of low value personal goods"
that are eligible for avoidance under section 522(0 of the Code.8 3
In In re Leonard,84 the Tenth Circuit also interpreted the relationship be-
tween a debtor's avoidance powers under section 522(0 and the opt-out rights
given the states by section 522(b). Under the applicable Colorado exemption
statute, the debtor was permitted to exempt household goods to the extent
of $1,500 in value. The debtor claimed the exemption and sought to avoid the
nonpurchase money security interest encumbering the goods. The creditor relied
upon the definition of "value" contained in the statute, which defined value
as "the difference between the fair market value and the amount of the debt.'8
The creditor argued that such a definition has the effect of limiting the exempt
property to unencumbered property held by the debtor, thus effectively ex-
cluding all of the debtor's encumbered property from exempt property status
and preventing the liens against this property from being avoided under sec-
tion 522(f).86
The court declined to read the opt-out provision in section 522(b)(2) as
giving states the authority to determine whether liens against such property
would be subject to avoidance in bankruptcy.8 7 In reaching its conclusion, the
court focused on the "clear and plain language" of section 522(0 in these words:
goId.
81859 U.S. 70 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
82In re Thompson, 750 E2d at 631 (citing J. Blackmun's concurring opinion in United States v. Security
Indus. Park, 459 U.S. 70, 83 (1982).).
831d.
84866 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1989).
851d. at 336.
qId.
871d.
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Section 522(b) permits a state to specify what property may be
exempted in lieu of the property exempted by Congress under
section 522(d) .... However, a debtor may avoid a lien encum-
bering exempted property to the extent that the "lien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled
under subsection (b)" of this section. 11 U.S.C. section 522(f)
(emphasis added). Subsection (b) refers to the property exempt,
ed by Congress or the states from the bankruptcy estate. The
quoted language is the key to unlock the answer to the issue
presented.... A debtor is entitled to avoid a lien to the extent
the debtor would have been entitled to an exemption under
either the federal or state exemption statutes. The debtor's
right to claim avoidance of a lien on property under section
522(f) is determined by considering whether the property, if
unencumbered, is exempted under the state statutory exemp-
tions. If unencumbered property may be exempted under the
state exemption, then any nonpossessory, nonpurchase money
lien on that property could be avoided under section 522(f).
Congress did not say a debtor is entitled to avoid a lien to the
extent the debtor is entitled to an exemption. ... The word
"would" obviously has been used by Congress in an auxiliary
function to express a possibility, i.e. if the debtor would have
been entitled to an exemption, he is entitled to avoid the lien.88
The court held that the Colorado exemption was one that the debtor
"would" have enjoyed had there not been a lien against it; the lien was there-
fore one that could be avoided pursuant to section 522(f).89 It also noted that
"[ilf section 522(f) were to be read as allowing the debtor to avoid a lien only
on the debtor's equity in the exempt property, to which the lien would not
ultimately attach under any circumstances, it would totally disregard the lien
avoidance language set forth in section 522(f)."90 Moreover, such a construc-
tion of section 522(f) would mean that "as long as a security interest existed
against such property, the debtor would never be able to avoid the lien,' which
the court stated "would make the language [of section 522(f)] meaningless and
would lead to an absurd result "'91 The court also looked to the legislative his-
tory of section 522, and cited the House and Senate reports on the necessity
of the lien avoidance provision of section 522(f) to protect the debtor's enjoy-
ment of exemptions in bankruptcy.92
881d. at 336-37.
89Id. at 336.
90Id. at 337.
91d.
92 d.
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The two remaining courts of appeal decisions interpreting the extent of
the states' opt-out powers under section 522(b) are from the Eleventh Circuit.
In In re Hall93 and In re Maddox, 94 the Eleventh Circuit held that the states'
opt-out powers under section 522(b) apply only to the federal exemptions un-
der subsection (d) of section 522.
In In re Hall, the debtors wanted to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase
money security interests against household property under section 522(f). Rely
ing upon a Georgia exemption statute providing for an exemption only for un-
encumbered household goods, the creditors argued that the debtors were
precluded from using the lien avoidance provision under section 522(f) of the
Code.95 The court viewed this as in conflict with section 522(f).96 It stated:
[Section 522(f)] operates to permit a debtor to avoid the fix-
ing of a lien on property if that avoidance would allow the debt-
or to enjoy an exemption. Thus, the very purpose of the stat-
ute is to permit debtors to claim, as exempt, property
completely or partially secured by an otherwise valid lien. To
permit states to inhibit the operation of the lien-avoidance pro-
vision simply by defining all lien-encumbered property as "not
exempt" would render the statute useless, a result inconsis-
tent with the well-established principle of statutory construc
tion requiring that all parts of an act be given effect, if at all
possible.97
Conceding that states are not "prohibited from defining lien-encumbered
property as not exempt," the court concluded that such a restriction would still
be subject to the provision of section 522(f) permitting the avoidance of such
liens in bankruptcy.98 It found support in its reading of the statute in the legis-
lative history of sections 522(b) and (f). It noted that both the Senate and House
versions of these provisions had "considered the debtor's lien-avoidance power
in conjunction with exemptions defined by state law," which it stated was evi-
dence that the "debtor's lien-avoidance powers would not be eviscerated by
state-defined exemptions' 99 It was also influenced by the Congressional in-
tention that section 522(f) respond to "unconscionable creditor practices" of
taking nonpossessory, nonpurchase money liens against a debtor's household
property as leverage to coerce debtors to make loan payments in fear of losing
93752 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1985).
94713 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983).
9"752 F.2d at 584.
96d. at 586.
971d. (citations omitted).
98id.
9Id. at 587.
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such property °° By permitting the debtors to avoid such liens in bankruptcy
under section 522(0, debtors would be protected from coercion and would be
left with enough property to have a fresh start after bankruptcy.O1 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the Georgia exemption statute did not preclude debtors
from seeking relief under section 522(0.
Again, in In re Maddox,102 the court was required to determine whether
a nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest in household goods was
avoidable under Georgia's exemption laws. It adopted the opinion of the dis-
trict court, which focused on the language of the Georgia statute describing
the exempt property as the "debtor's interest" in household goods.0 3 The creditor
in this case argued that the term "debtor's interest" was limited to a debtor's
equity interest in the property; thus, encumbered household goods were ex-
cluded from the definition of exempt property, and therefore, were not avoida-
ble under section 522(0.104
The district court disagreed with the creditor's interpretation of the term
"debtor's interest" and held that such an interpretation would make section
522 (0 "meaningless"0 s The court noted that the term "debtor's interest" was
also used in the federal exemption provisions under section 522(d), and stat-
ed that Congress did not intend that the term be limited to a debtor's equity
interest 106 It also relied upon statements in legislative history:
[Tihe bill gives the debtor certain rights not available under
current law with respect to exempt property. The debtor may
avoid any judicial lien on exempt property and nonpurchase
money security interest in certain exempt property such as
household goods.07
The court also noted that the word "interest" as defined under the Code is
broadly used to include all property interests that a debtor may have in prop'
erty and is not limited to equity interests.0 8 Moreover, the court added that
if the Georgia statute had specifically excluded encumbered household goods
from its exemption law, it would probably rule that such an attempt to circum-
vent section (f) would fail under the supremacy clause of article IV, clause 2
of the Constitution, and the conflict between the state exemption law and the
federal lien avoidance law would be resolved in favor of the federal lien avoidance
1ld, at 588.
l1l]'d.
102713 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983).
103id. at 1528.
1041'd.
105d.
b06ld. at 1528-29.
107Id. (citing H.R. RE. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& Anwmi. NEws 5787, 6087-88).
108ld. at 1530.
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rule of section (f).09
M1. OPTING OUT UNDER SECTION 522(b): COMMENTARY
AND ANALYSIS
In the Court of Appeals decisions of Dominion Bank, In re Thompson, In
re Leonard, In re Hall and In re Maddox, there is a uniform reliance on the legis-
lative history to support the interpretation of section 522(b) as limiting the
authority of the states to opt out of only the federal exemptions under subsec-
tion (d).1O As discussed above, exemptions have always been very important
in implementing the fresh start policy of bankruptcy law and in initiating the
debtor's financial rehabilitation. The House Report states:
The historical purpose of... exemption laws has been to pro-
tect a debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the ba-
sic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all
of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left desti-
tute and a public charge. The purpose has not changed...
Though exemption laws have been considered within the
province of State law under the current Bankruptcy Act, [the
Reform Act] adopts the position that there is a Federal interest
in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes
out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start."
Congress was particularly concerned that exemptions be provided to the
bankrupt debtor. It fortified this concern by granting debtors the authority to
avoid judicial liens on exempt personal and real property, and to avoid nonpos-
sessory, nonpurchase money security interests in specific types of exempt per-
sonal property under subsection (f).P2
As the legislative history of section 522 reveals, one of the reasons that
Congress included the lien avoidance provision was to ensure the debtor's en-
joyment of exempt property to assist in the debtor's fresh start. This would
allow the debtor to avoid certain liens against the property that would other-
wise impair his or her right to retain exempt property free of secured creditor
claims. Another reason for including the lien avoidance provision was to put
an end to the undesirable creditor practice of using security interests against
exempt property as a means of forcing the bankrupt debtor to reaffirm a debt
109 ,d
110See Aetna Fin. Co. v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 866 F.2d 335, 336-37 (10th Cir. 1989); Dominion
Bank of Cumberland, N.A. v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408, 412-13 (4th Cir. 1985); Hall v. Finance One (In re
Hall), 752 E2d 582, 587-88 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Thompson, 750 F.2d 628, 630-31 (8th Cir. 1984) and
Maddox v. Southern Discount Co. (In re Maddox), 713 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1983).
111H.R. REP. No. 95-595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD,
imm. NEWs 5787, 6087-88.
"
2 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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with a creditor, and thus result in the debtor's forfeiture of the full benefits
of bankruptcy discharge. The House Report states:
[T)he bill gives the debtor certain rights not available under
current law with respect to exempt property. The debtor may
avoid any judicial lien on exempt property, and any nonpur-
chase money security interest in certain exempt property such
as household goods. The first right allows the debtor to undo
the actions of creditors that bring legal action against the debtor
shortly before bankruptcy. Bankruptcy exists to provide re-
lief for an overburdened debtor. If a creditor beats the debtor
into court, the debtor is nevertheless entitled to his exemp-
tions. The second right will be of more significance for the aver-
age consumer debtor. Frequently, creditors lending money to
a consumer debtor take a security interest in all of the debt-
or's belongings, and obtains a waiver by the debtor of his ex-
emptions. In most of these cases, the debtor is unaware of the
consequences of the forms he signs. The creditor's experience
provides him with a substantial advantage. If the debtor en-
counters financial difficulty, creditors often use threats of repos-
session of all of the debtor's household goods as a means of
obtaining payment.... The exemption provision allows the
debtor, after bankruptcy has been filed, and creditor collec-
tion techniques have been stayed, to undo the consequences
of a contract of adhesion, signed in ignorance, by permitting
the invalidation of nonpurchase money security interests in
household goods. Such security interests have too often been
used by over-reaching creditors. The bill eliminates any un-
fair advantage creditors have.P3
The strength of the legislative history behind section 522 is a most compel-
ling argument to support the interpretation that section 522(b) does not autho-
rize the states to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of subsection (f).
In upholding a state exemption law that enforced judgment liens against
exempt property based on the prior status of the property as nonexempt,1 4
the court in Owen v. Owen also made a reference to the legislative history of
section 522(b). It noted that avoidance of judicial liens under section 522(f)
was designed to preserve a debtor's right to exempt property in cases where
creditors race to the courts to obtain judgment liens against exempt property
113H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADuw.
NEws 5787, 6087-88.
114See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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immediately before the debtor's bankruptcy petition is filed. The court then
suggested that the judgment hen in question was not the type of lien subject
to avoidance under subsection (f), because the creditor did not obtain it im-
mediately before the debtor's bankruptcy.
While it is true that one of the reasons that Congress included the lien avoid-
ance provision was to put an end to this creditor practice, it is not the only reason
for the provision. In its selective and limited look at the legislative history of
section 522, the court in Owen v. Owen ignored the fundamental and most sig-
nificant purpose of the bankruptcy exemption, to ensure the debtor's fresh start
after bankruptcy by providing him or her with the necessities of life identified
as exempt property. Congress gave greater meaning to the overall concept of the
bankruptcy exemption by enacting section 522(f) to provide the bankrupt debtor
with the authority to avoid judgment liens against all property qualifying as exempt
at the time of bankruptcy, without any distinction concerning the status of the
property as exempt at the time that the lien may have attached to the property.
The courts in In re Pine and in In re McManus elected to dismiss the legis-
lative history in holding that section 522(b) permits states to opt out of both
the lien avoidance provision of subsection (f) as well as the federal exemptions
under subsection (d)."15 They read the language of section 522(b) to support
the states' right to opt out of the lien avoidance provision under subsection
(f). When considering the language of section 522(b), there is greater support
for the argument made by the courts in In re Leonard and Dominion Bank that
the language of section 522(b) is properly interpreted to limit the opt-out rights
of the states to the list of federal exemptions under subsection (d), and to ex-
clude any right to opt out of the lien avoidance provisions of subsection (f)." 6
The only reference to a state's right to opt out of any provision in section
522 is found in subsection (b). Subsection (b) makes no reference to a state's
right to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of subsection (f); what it does
refer to is the right of the states to opt out of the list of federal exemptions
under subsection (d), stating:
[Ain individual debtor may exempt from property of the es-
tate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the al-
ternative paragraph (2) of this subsection ....
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section,
unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under para
graph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize;
117
"T1 E.g., Giles v. Credithrift of America, Inc. (In re Pine), 717 F.2d 281,284 (6th Cir. 1983); and McManus
v. Avco Fin. Serv. (In re McManus), 681 F.2d 353, 357 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982).
116E.g., Aetna Fin. Co. v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 866 F.2d 335, 336 (10th Cir. 1989); and Dominion
Bank of Cumberland, N.A. v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408, 412 (4th Cir. 1985).
11711 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West 1976) (emphasis added).
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Section 522(b) is very clear in limiting the state's right to opt out of the list
of federal exemptions under subsection (d). Because it only refers to subsec-
tion (d) of 522, it should not be read to expand the "opt-out" powers to include
the lien avoidance provision of subsection (f).
However, because there is a division among the courts on whether the states
may opt out of subsection (f) as well as subsection (d), it is more appropriate
to recognize that there is an ambiguity in the language of section 522(b) regarding
the extent of the opt-out rights of states under the provision. If this is conced-
ed, then the rules of statutory construction require that the legislative histo-
ry of section 522 and exemption law in bankruptcy be considered to clarify
any ambiguity. Sutherland states:
A well-drafted statute should reduce the frequency of disputes
about interpretation. Because all future circumstances cannot
be anticipated by even the most far-sighted legislator, the
necessity for judicial interpretation can never be completely
eliminated. Before the true meaning of a statute can be deter-
mined where there is a genuine uncertainty concerning its ap-
plication, consideration must be given to the problem in soci-
ety to which the legislature addressed itself. Prior legislative
consideration of the problem, the legislative history of the stat-
ute under litigation, and the operation and administration of
the statute prior to litigation are of equal importance." 8
Based on the legislative history of the provision, section 522(b) must be
read to permit states only to opt out of the list of federal exemptions provided
under subsection (d), and not the lien avoidance provision of subsection (f).
The legislative history of section 522 would clearly preclude states from defining
exempt property in a manner that would circumvent the lien avoidance power
granted to debtors under subsection (f).P19
Furthermore, if states are permitted to opt out of the lien avoidance pow-
ers granted under subsection (f), subsection (f) becomes a "meaningless" pro-
vision. 20 The court in In re Hall noted that such an interpretation of section
522(f) is "inconsistent with the well-established principle of statutory construc-
tion requiring that all parts of an act be given effect, if at all possible"' One
118 2AJ. SuTBERLAND, STATuTEs AN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02 (4th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1989).
119E.g., Aetna Fin. Co. v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 366 F.2d 335,337(10th Cir. 1989); Dominion Bank
of Cumberland, N.A. v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408, 412-13 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Thompson, 750 F.2d 628,
630-31 (8th Cir. 1984); Giles v. Credithrift of America, Inc. (In re Pine), 717 F.2d at 284; Maddox v. Southern
Discount Co. (In re Maddox), 713 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1983); and McManus v. Avco Fin. Serv. (In
re McManus), 681 F.2d 353, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1982) (Dyer, J., dissenting).
12OSee Aetna Fin. Co. v. Leonard (In re Leonard), 866 F.2d 335, 337; and Maddox v. Southern Discount
Co. (In re Maddox), 713 F.2d 1526, 1528-29.
12752 F.2d at 586.
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authority on statutory construction has described the task of the courts in deal
ing with potentially conflicting provisions as follows:
fT]he court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions
of the statute by endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile every
part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to draft a stat-
ute, or any other writing for that matter, which may not in
some manner contain conflicting provisions. But what appears
to the reader to be a conflict may not have seemed so to the
drafter. Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for a defi-
nite reason. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety,
what appears to be on its face a conflict may be cleared up
and the provisions reconciled....
Consequently, that construction which will leave every
word operative will be favored over one which leaves some
word or provision meaningless because of inconsistency 22
As stated in the legislative history of section 522, the primary purpose of
subsection (f) is to enable the debtor to avoid liens against property that would
be exempt but for the liens against it.123 Accordingly, it does not seem logical
that Congress would have intended to permit states to circumvent the lien avoid-
ance provision of subsection (f) by defining exempt property in a manner that
would render the provision meaningless.
Because of this conflict between section 522(f) and the state exemption
laws, a constitutional issue arises under the supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution. In Butner v. The United States, 24 the Supreme Court gives a descrip-
tion of the delicate balance between federal bankruptcy law and state laws that
is relevant to the federal bankruptcy process:
The Federal Constitution, Article I, section 8, gives Congress
the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcy throughout the United States. In view of this grant of
authority to the Congress it has been settled from an early
date that state laws to the extent that they conflict with the
laws of congress, enacted under its constitutional authority,
on the subject of bankruptcies are suspended. While this is
true, state laws are thus suspended only to the extent of ac-
tual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act
of Congress. 25
122 E. CRAWI'ORD, MM CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 165 (1940).123Supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
124440 U.S. 48 (1979).
1231d. at 54 n.9 (quoting Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918)).
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The state exemption laws considered in the cases that permit states to opt out
of the lien avoidance provisions of section 522(f) effectively circumvent the
lien avoidance provision of section 522(f). Consequently, the state laws would
have to fail under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, to the extent that
they are in conflict with the objective of federal bankruptcy law to facilitate
the debtor's full benefit of exemptions through the avoidance of judicial liens
and nonpurchase money security interests against qualifying exempt property.Y
IV. CONCLUSION
Exempt property has always been a mainstay of federal bankruptcy law.
The bankruptcy exemption laws were given additional force under the Bankrupt-
cy Reform Act of 1978. Under the Reform Act, Congress granted the debtor
the power to avoid liens against certain exempt property to ensure his or her
enjoyment of exemptions in bankruptcy, and to put an end to overreaching by
secured creditors who had made a practice of obtaining interests in exempt prop-
erty as a means of forcing debtors to reaffirm their debts to avoid foreclosure
against the property.
The interpretive question, which threatens the significance of the lien avoid-
ance powers enjoyed by debtors under section 522 of the Code, is whether
states that elect to opt out of the federal exemptions provided for under sub,
section (d) of section 522 may also opt out of the debtor's right to avoid liens
under subsection (f). This debate has found its way into the federal circuit courts
of appeal and has resulted in a division not only among the circuits but also
within the Eleventh Circuit. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will resolve this
debate when it renders its decision in Owen v. Owen.
After reviewing the statute, legislative history and case law on this ques-
tion, it is the conclusion of this article that section 522(b) does not permit states
to opt out of the lien avoidance provision of subsection (f). This interpreta-
tion of section 522(b) is in accord with the language of section 522(b), because
the statute specifically gives to the states the right to opt out of the list of fed,
eral exemptions under subsection (d) of section 522, but it makes no reference
to opting out of the lien avoidance powers of subsection (f).
An even more compelling argument is found in the legislative history of
section 522, which indicates that the lien avoidance provision of section 522(f)
was a crucial addition to the provision of exemptions to bankrupt debtors un-
der the Code. Congress was concerned that exemptions in the past had been
somewhat elusive for debtors under state law, and that creditors had quite of-
ten taken overreaching interests in such property as a means of exercising lever-
age over the debtor. Accordingly, the lien avoidance provision became impor-
'
26E.g., Hall v. Finance One (In re Hall), 752 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1985); and Maddox v. Southern
Discount Co. (In re Maddox), 713 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir. 1983).
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tant in preserving the debtor's enjoyment of exemptions at bankruptcy and in
perpetuating the fresh start policy of bankruptcy law. Thus, state statutes that
define exempt property in a manner that effectively opts out of the lien avoid-
ance provision of section 522(f) must fail because they are in direct conflict
with federal bankruptcy law and policy, and are superseded by the lien avoid,
ance provision of section 522(f).
